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LOOKING TO THE LITIGANT: REACTION ESSAY TO
FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Claire B. Wofford*
1

Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of the United States Supreme Court
does a lot of things—and does them extremely well. At the most general level, it
offers us a collection of new opinions in twenty-five key U.S. Supreme Court cases
related to gender. Beginning with one of the earliest instances of the Court’s
2
approach to women’s rights (Bradwell v. Illinois in 1872) and reaching across
subsequent decades to the landmark 2015 case on gay marriage (Obergefell v.
3
Hodges ), each essay in the volume uses feminist theory and method to reformulate
Supreme Court opinions and legal doctrine to better reflect feminist conceptions of
equality and justice.
In so doing, the collection first reminds us of the extent to which the high
court’s promulgations have affected central, tangible areas of our lives
(reproduction, sexuality, employment, family) and affected them in ways often
unfriendly to certain feminist principles. The book also underscores the importance
of the Court’s membership and shows us that who a justice is (or is not) can have an
enormous impact on the shape and substance of the law. Traditional judicial
opinions are often written as if their interpretations and conclusions are the
inevitable consequence of neutral reasoning and rigorous logic; every essay here
challenges that presumption and demonstrates just how much opinions are
influenced by the situated perspectives of the jurist. Most fundamentally, the
collection demonstrates that law can be different than it is or was and that feminist
inquiry can show us how.
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1 FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
(Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger & Bridget J. Crawford eds., 2016) [hereinafter FEMINIST
JUDGMENTS].
2 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
3 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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So, what is there to add? One could quibble mildly with the book’s exclusion
of important lower court opinions, certain topics, or its confinement of authors to the
extant legal record. But every collection of essays requires choices and every set of
editors wrestles with how best to render their vision. Indeed, these editors are more
upfront than many about how and why they made the decisions they did. Rather
than critique the book’s coverage or content, I think it is more helpful to model its
approach to feminist method and theory in examining another potential locus of
inequality in the law.
As the editors detail, feminist method comes in a variety of forms—use of
4
narrative or asking the “woman question,” for instance. Similarly, feminist theory
contains a variety of perspectives—from the “same as” claims of formal equality to
the less relativistic approaches of agency and antisubordination. What all the
perspectives have in common, however, is that they shine light where there was none
before, revealing biased assumptions and adding substantive knowledge that has
remained covert. I suggest that even a cursory use of those same tools indicates that,
aside from the jurist, there is another important player in the legal system whose
potentially gendered choices are shaping the law: the litigant.
Feminist Judgments’s focus on jurists alone is not unusual. My own discipline
has devoted a great deal of study to understanding why and how the justices of the
5
U.S. Supreme Court make the decisions they do. Some of the scholarship has even
examined whether women judges might operate differently than their male
6
counterparts, though the findings have been mixed at best. The emphasis,
moreover, is understandable and laudable, as it is jurists who have the final say on
7
the content of law.
Emphasizing judicial behavior, however, unfortunately overlooks the
fundamental passivity of the courts. As much as they might wish to do so, jurists
cannot reach out into the world of potential legal disputes and select certain topics
for resolution; they must wait for a litigant to bring the dispute to them. Indeed,
were it not for the litigants bringing cases into the legal system in the first place,
there would be no vehicle through which jurists make the law. The jurist may be the
law’s sculptor, but the “raw material” with which he or she works is provided by a
litigant. Moreover, if that litigant’s behavior has been shaped by gender, then the
judicial opinion, whoever has written it, has been as well. To put it simply, if gender
is influencing the cases on which jurists work, then gender has influenced the content
of law—even if the jurist operates with a feminist perspective.

4 Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 831 (1990).
5 See, e.g., MICHAEL A. BAILEY & FORREST MALTZMAN, THE CONSTRAINED COURT:
LAW, POLITICS, AND THE DECISIONS JUSTICES MAKE (2011); LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE
CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
6 See Christina L. Boyd, She’ll Settle It?, 1 J.L. & CTS. 193, 201–11 (2013); Christina L.
Boyd et al., Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389, 390–92
(2010).
7 This is most clearly seen in the case of appellate judges, who write opinions based on
questions of law and thereby generate legal policy.
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So, what can feminist theory and method tell us about litigants and their
8
behavior? As I have argued elsewhere, female litigants might make choices over
whether and how to use the legal system differently than men. There is evidence
from social science and legal scholarship that women are more risk averse than men,
9
avoid competition more, and withdraw earlier from competitive environments.
When it comes to conflict resolution, women also seem to be more collaborative
than men, rejecting fighting over “zero sum” winners and losers in favor of
10
cooperation, compromise, and solutions that “make everyone happier.”
Litigation in the United States, however, is an inherently risky, competitive,
and adversarial environment. Female litigants therefore may be more reluctant to
pursue legal action when they are harmed. Having filed lawsuits, they may also be
less combative in the legal process than their male counterparts. In terms of the
practicalities of litigation, this translates into women being less likely than men to
bring cases into court and more likely to resolve the cases they do file through
mediation or settlement rather than seek a “winner-take-all” final victory from a jury
or judge.
11
I have tested these predictions using survey experiments.
Imagining
themselves harmed by a classic “slip and fall” injury and an instance of gender-based
pay discrimination, survey respondents answered questions about whether and how
they would pursue legal action.12 The results indicated that women were generally
less litigation prone than men, though only when the injury was the physical harm;

8 Claire B. Wofford, Avoiding Adversariness? The Effects of Gender on Litigant DecisionMaking, 13 POL. & GENDER 656, 675–76 (2017) [hereinafter Avoiding Adversariness?]; Claire B.
Wofford, The Effect of Gender and Relational Distance on Plaintiff Decision Making in the
Litigation Process, 51 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 966, 969–73 (2017) [hereinafter The Effect of Gender
and Relational Distance].
9 James P. Byrnes et al., Gender Differences in Risk Taking: A Meta-Analysis, 125
PSYCHOL. BULL. 367, 369 (1999); Gary Charness & Uri Gneezy, Strong Evidence for Gender
Differences in Risk Taking, 83 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 50, 57 (2012); Charles B. Craver & David
W. Barnes, Gender, Risk Taking, and Negotiation Performance, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 299, 328–
39 (1999); Seda Ertac & Mehmet Y. Gurdal, Deciding to Decide: Gender, Leadership and RiskTaking in Groups, 83 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 24, 26–29 (2012); Christine R. Harris et al., Gender
Differences in Risk Assessment: Why Do Women Take Fewer Risks than Men?, 1 JUDGMENT &
DECISION MAKING 48, 51 (2006); Phoebe A. Morgan, Risking Relationships: Understanding the
Litigation Choices of Sexually Harassed Women, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 67, 88 (1999).
10 Avoiding Adversariness?, supra note 8, at 659; see, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A
DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (1982); Deborah M.
Kolb & Gloria G. Coolidge, Her Place at the Table: A Consideration of Gender Issues in
Negotiation, in NEGOTIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 261 (J. William Breslin & Jeffrey Z. Rubin
eds., 1991); Mark A. Boyer et al., Gender and Negotiation: Some Experimental Findings from an
International Negotiation Simulation, 53 INT’L STUD. Q. 23, 40 n.19 (2009); Charles B. Craver,
Gender and Negotiation Performance, 4 SOC. PRAC. 183, 187 (2002); Elizabeth Miklya Legerski
& Marie Cornwall, Working-Class Job Loss, Gender, and the Negotiation of Household Labor, 24
GENDER & SOC’Y 447, 465–67 (2010); Morgan, supra note 9, at 70; Laura Sanchez, Gender, Labor
Allocations, and the Psychology of Entitlement Within the Home, 73 SOC. FORCES 533, 546–48
(1994).
11 Avoiding Adversariness?, supra note 8, at 656–82; The Effect of Gender and Relational
Distance, supra note 8, at 966–1000.
12 Avoiding Adversariness?, supra note 8, at 663.
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when women suffered from pay discrimination, they were more likely than men to
file lawsuits, at least in one set of results.13 Across two experiments, women were
more likely than men to favor mediation instead of filing lawsuits and favored it
more than men for resolving the dispute once litigation had begun.14 Lastly, both
men and women were much less willing to bring the pay discrimination case into
court than they were with the “slip and fall” injury.15
The implications of these findings for law and the legal system are
multifaceted. First, women may not be taking advantage of the potential benefits of
litigation as much as men. Whatever gains they could achieve from litigation—
financial compensation, publicity for the wrongdoer, feelings of personal
empowerment—cannot be realized if they do not file cases or pursue them fully. In
addition, as men are more combative during litigation, the legal process itself may
be slower, costlier, and more adversarial than it need be.
Perhaps most importantly, the cases that eventually end up in the hands of
jurists may themselves be gendered. If lawsuits are filed disproportionally by men,
and men litigate over different issues, then certain types of cases are more likely to
become the vehicle for lawmaking. This does not undercut the bravery and
commitment of the female litigants highlighted in Feminist Judgments, but it does
16
suggest that those plaintiffs and those cases are unusual outliers. Both men and
women, moreover, are less likely to file lawsuits involving one type of sex
discrimination. What this means is that even if jurists want to remedy such
inequalities through the law, they may frequently be denied the opportunity to do so.
The cases excerpted in Feminist Judgments therefore are quite remarkable, not (just)
because of their importance for legal doctrine, but simply because they ended up in
the legal system in the first place.
As with all empirical work, my studies have major limitations. At the
theoretical level, they rest upon ideas about gender that are largely essentialist and
ignore (for now) how race, class, or sexual identity may also shape litigant behavior.
Because so few survey respondents, both men and women, ever said they would
pursue a case all the way to an appeal, the experiments also cannot speak directly to
the production of appellate court opinions, where most legal policymaking occurs.
And, of course, there are the myriad ways in which the gender (and race and class,
etc.) of other legal actors might be impacting the legal system.
At the same time, however, I would suggest that examining whether gender
affects litigant decisionmaking is a worthy question and there is some evidence for
an affirmative, and important, answer. Again, because it is the litigant’s choices that
generate the cases on which jurists work, any gendering of those choices necessarily
means a gendering of the law. Even if the jurist were to model the opinions in
Feminist Judgments, that opinion would still be influenced by gender, albeit in a
very subtle way. Given that most judges in the United States (and all of those on the

13 Id. at 675.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 See the powerful story of Christy Brzonkala, for example. Aníbal Rosario Lebrón,
Rewritten Opinion in United States v. Morrison, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 1, at 453–
56.
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current U.S. Supreme Court) are generally not writing in a feminist way, the law has
potentially suffered from a “double whammy” of bias in opinion writing and bias in
the cases themselves. Such a conclusion is certainly not comforting, but, as with
Feminist Judgments itself, illustrates the central importance of feminist methods of
scholarship. Only through continuing such a pursuit, by pushing our analyses
onward and outward, will we be able to fully assess the inequities of the legal system
and the law.

